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China is on its way to becoming the top ranked superpower in the world, likely to 
surpass the United States in terms of stunning and perpetual economic growth. To 
facilitate the types of economic growth needed to both invest in and sustain its 
infrastructure development, urbanisation and international fortification of its power, a 
change was required for President Xi’s China administration to address complex yet 
commanding forces of populational ageing. The major corrosive consequence of this 
impinged on an imbalance in its populational profile geared towards older people 
(who were and are living longer lives due, it has been claimed, to advancements in 
medicine, diet and technology). It has long been stated “China will grow old before it 
grows rich”; despite wealth accumulation, China’s ageing profile is no secret however
given the numbers there are some startling implications.
Indeed, the year 2015 saw the Xi administration in China signal the end of the ‘single 
child family policy’ which had the complex backdrop of both an increasing ageing 
population and up to four generational families as an unintended consequence of that 
policy. This controversial policy, lambasted and praised in equal measure depending 
on perspective, has meant a swift expansion in the number of single children only 
households at the very same time that the proportion of older people has also 
increased as a new era of prosperity has reached many households in China. There 
have been some estimates, which suggest that up to 300,000,000 fewer people have 
been born as a result of this process of state intervention.
At the same time, improved living standards through what has been coined the 
modernisation process in China would have led to the same outcome voluntarily as 
growing numbers of urban settlers in particular have chosen to reduce their family 
size from a traditional extended structure to more nuclear, micro, fragmented, mobile 
and fluid structures of family typicality. This last point hints at the important spatial 
dimension of demographic change in China. There is a marked contrast between 
urban and rural life in China and, closely related to this, a marked contrast between 
Eastern China and Western China. It is in the heavily urbanised locales in which 
China’s spatial transformation is most dramatic, with fast-expanding super metropolis 
cities.
Coupled with this, the Xi administration views the relationship between ageing 
populations and labour force participation with panic and recognises important public 
policy challenges, including the need to reverse recent trends toward decreasing 
labour force participation of workers in late-middle and old age. Ending the one-child 
policy and recalibrating its populational profile will take an enormous amount of time 
and effort particularly to deal with its ageing population. With economic growth 
sustaining rather than accelerating, the issue is with populational growth for people 
aged 65 and over which is predicted by 2050 to be over 330,000,000; a size that is 
more than comparable with the current size of the entire North American population.
Ending the one-child policy creates a number of challenges for public policy makers.
First, the actual proportion of the ageing population is growing faster than that of 
Japan’s populational forecasting, the nation state in Asia that was previously 
recognised as having the fastest rate, and much faster than ALL nations in occidental 
Europe. The power of the future impact depends on the (in)ability of China to resolve 
the demographic change problems through increased privatisation, pension reforms, 
migration across China, and extension of retirement age. China will ultimately have to
tackle issues related to pension reform and the provision of long-term health care 
services.
Second, an untimely arrival of an ageing population before modernisation has fully 
taken place. It is certain that China will face a severely ageing population in particular
before it has sufficient time and resources to establish an adequate social security and 
social services system for older people. By 2030, there will be only two working-age 
Chinese people to support every retiree. Yet not all of Chinese workers have 
government- or company-funded pensions or medical coverage. However, as a 
counterbalance to such a dystopian perspective, China, through economic growth, is 
currently accumulating vast wealth as a result of globalisation, wealth that could 
potentially be redirected for the support of its ageing population.
Third, there will be imbalanced flows in the dependency ratio in China. The Xi 
administration estimates are that the country will reach a higher dependent burden 
earlier in the twenty-first century than was previously forecast. Indeed, the now 
abandoned fertility policy (single child per family) and its implementation has had a 
strong influence on the ageing process and may now be unravelling. However, fewer 
children are still being born given the obsolete fertility policy is only 24 months old, 
but with more older people, a conflict STILL arises between the objectives to limit 
population increases and yet maintain a balanced age structure.
In conclusion, it could be portended that public policy in China needs to be driven by 
intergenerational solidarity and stronger relations across generations and the polity 
rather than through populational tensions between such groups across the life-course. 
Intergenerational cohesion should be encouraged but the overriding emphasis should 
be on providing support that fosters active lifestyles and independent living wherever 
and whenever possible. This means encouragement to all groups across the life-course
to share their accumulated experience, to provide their biographical histories and their
views on the momentous changes that they, along with China itself, have experienced 
yesterday, will experience today and may experience tomorrow.
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